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דיון אם הייתי גר בפריפריה הייתי מתאבד

זה לא משנה
סטיפס מת

פרצו לשם כמה פעמים. הייתה תקופה שחשבתי גם לעשות משהו ולסבך אותו עם פעולות יותר גרועות. זה אתר של קטינים גם. אבל ירדתי מזה
 
  • אהבתי
סימוני אימוג׳י: Memento Mori
כי דרשת מקור אני נברתי בנבכי הרשת ומצאתי עותק דיגיטלי של אנאדות לפלוטינוס


מוזמן לעיין ב- VI.8 בו הוא דן על רצון האל בבריאה
ביחס שלו ל"ישנות" / קיום כאל תואר / תכונה ולכן ריבוי ולא מהות. אני טוען שעולות מפה בעיות.
(מסתמא האבחנה הזו לא קורה בפילוסופיא אחרי הביקורת של קאנט).

גם ידוע לכל יחס הרמב"ם להגשמה.
הוא מסביר זאת. מוה"נ חלק א פרק נה
וממה שראוי בהכרח שירוחק ממנו גם כן, הדימוי לשום דבר מן הנמצאות. וזה דבר כבר הרגיש בו כל אדם, וכבר גלה בספרי הנביאים בהרחקת הדמוי ואמר: "וְאֶל מִי תְדַמְּיוּנִי וְאֶשְׁוֶה" (ישעיה מ, כה), ואמר: "וְאֶל מִי תְּדַמְּיוּן אֵל [וּמַה דְּמוּת תַּעַרְכוּ לוֹ]" (ישעיה מ, יח), ואמר: "מֵאֵין כָּמוֹךָ [ה]" (ירמיה י, ו), וזה הרבה.

כללו של דבר, כי כל דבר שמביא לאחד מאלו המינים הארבעה, ראוי בהכרח להרחיקו ממנו במופת המבואר. והוא:

כל מה שיביא לגשמות. או -
מה שיביא להיפעלות ושנוי. או -
מה שיביא להֶעְדֵר, כמו שלא יהיה לו דבר בפעל ואחר כן ישוב בפעל. או -
מה שיביא לדמיון דבר מבריאותיו.


...
 
אני מנסה להיכנס לפלוטינוס וזה שיט די קשה
בייחוד החלק של הנשמה. באנאדה הרביעי הוא מביא לדיון את PROBLEMS OF THE SOUL
 
נערך לאחרונה:
עוד הוא מזכיר על האגדה של הרקולס בתחילת הטרקטט הראשון (דומני שפתחת על זה אשכול בפורום דת ופילוסופיות)
מאניין
 
מתרגם הספר כותב שם בהקדמות שפלוטינוס כפר באמונה היודו-נוצרית של המקרא שאינה מבחינה בין גוף לנשמה באני / אגו (αὐτός)
בלשון הזאת:
אם זה נכון ש'סוקרטס היה אולי האדם הראשון באירובה שהיה לו תפיסה ברורה ועקבית של הנשמה כפי שאנו מבינים אותה, כלומר כאישיות המוסרית והאינטלקטואלית, הגורם האחראי בידיעה ובפעולה נכונה או שגויה', אזי פלוטינוס, יחד עם כמעט כל הפילוסופיה היוונית ועם אפלטון בפרט, חב לסוקרטס את מרכז מחשבתו ממש. בתחילת הקריירה שלו, בחיבורו על אלמותיות הנשמה (IV. 7), הוא מציין כי בין אם אנו דבקים במסורת האפלטונית שבה הגוף הוא הכלי של הנשמה, ובין אם במסורת האריסטוטלית שבה הנשמה היא הצורה או האקט של הגוף, בן האנוש המהותי – המזוהה עם מה שהיינו מכנים כיום ה'אגו' או ה'עצמי' שלו (αὐτός) – אינו לעולם השילוב (גוף-נשמה) אלא תמיד הנשמה לבדה. בכך, במחי כף אחת, פלוטינוס נמצא בניגוד לתפיסה המקראית והיהודית-נוצרית, אשר מסרבת להכיר בניגוד יסודי כלשהו, אפילו לא ניגוד לוגי, בין נשמה לגוף.
תפיסת הנשמה כמשכן האישיות מכינה את הדרך לנצרות, והעובדה שפלוטינוס, בעקבות סוקרטס ואפלטון, מרכז את תורתו בנקודה קרדינלית זו, מסבירה אולי במידת מה את ההשפעה העמוקה שהפעיל על ההוגים הנוצרים הראשונים ועל המסורת המיסטית של המערב.


פלוטינוס אף מרחיק לכת על הטענה שהנשמה עצמה הוויה מופסדת. הוא כותב שם בלשון ביקורתית חריפה בטרקטט התשיעי על אלו (דומני גנוסטים) שמדמים לעצמם כאילו הבריאה זו מלאכת ידיה של הנשמה לאחר הנפילה מכנפיה
 
נערך לאחרונה:
"אורות מאפל אמר ויהי"
"יוצר אור ובורא חושך"
זה משל סתום
אני מאמין שגם בהאצלה תהיה השתלשלות מאין (האחד). רק שאצל פלוטינוס הוא נמנע לומר את זה במפורש מסיבות אישיות (הוא נוקט שם בלשון זהירה). זה עדיין נשאר עמום למדי. מה שכן בבירור לא משנה איך תקרא את זה יש פה התייחסות לאין או העדר-יש כנקודת מוצא קודמת (ר"ל ישותית. לא כרונולוגית), כאשר למטה ממנה הכול נעשה עכור יותר ויותר ככול שמתרחקים מהאחד לחומרניות המופסדת ורעת הרוח


וראה ע', שם: פלוטינוס - "אנאדות", אנאדה ה'. טרקטט מס' 5. THAT THE INTELLECTUAL BEINGS ARE NOT OUTSIDE THE INTELLECTUAL-PRINCIPLE: AND ON THE NATURE OF THE GOOD [32]. פס' 5-7.

5. We return to our statement that The First remains intact even when other entities spring from it.

In the case of numbers the unit remains intact while something else produces, and thus number arises in dependence on the unit: much more then does the unit, The One, remain intact in the principle which is before all beings; especially since the entities produced in its likeness, while it thus remains intact, owe their existence to no other, but to its own all-sufficient power.

And just as there is, primarily or secondarily, some form or idea from the monad in each of the successive numbers — the later still participating, though unequally, in the unit — so the series of Beings following upon The First bear, each, some form or idea derived from that source. In Number the participation establishes Quantity; in the realm of Being, the trace of The One establishes reality: existence is a trace of The One — our word for entity may probably be connected with that for unity.

What we know as Being, the first sequent upon The One, advanced a little outward, so to speak, then chose to go no further, turned inward again and comes to rest and is now the reality and hearth (οὐσία and ἑστία) of the universe. Pressing (with the rough breathing) on the word for Being (ὄν) we have the word for One (ἕν), an indication that in our very form of speech we tell, as far as may be, that Being (the weaker) is that which proceeds from (the stronger,) The One. Thus both the thing that comes to be and Being itself are carriers of a copy, since they are outflows from the power of The Primal One: the Soul sees and in its emotion tries to represent what it sees and breaks into speech ‘ὄν — εἶναι — οὐσία — ἑστία’ (Existent; Existence; Essence; Hestia or Hearth), sounds which labour to express the essential nature of the universe produced by the travail of the utterer and so to represent, as far as sounds may, the origin of reality.

6. All this, however, we may leave to the individual judgement: to proceed:

This produced reality is an Ideal-form — for certainly nothing springing from the Supreme can be less — and it is not a particular form but the form of all, beside which there is no other; it follows that The First must be without form, and, if without form, then it is no Being; Being must have some definition and therefore be limited; but the First cannot be thought of as having definition and limit, for thus it would be not the Source but the particular item indicated by the definition assigned to it. If all things belong to the produced, which of them can be thought of as the Supreme? Not included among them, this can be described only as transcending them: but they are Being and the Beings; it therefore transcends Being.

Note that the phrase ‘transcending Being’ assigns no character, makes no assertion, allots no name, carries only the denial of particular being; and in this there is no attempt to circumscribe it: to seek to throw a line about that illimitable Nature would be folly, and anyone thinking to do so cuts himself off from any slightest and most momentary approach to its least vestige.

As one wishing to contemplate the Intellectual Nature will lay aside all the representations of sense and so may see what transcends the sense-realm, in the same way one wishing to contemplate what transcends the Intellectual attains by putting away all that is of the intellect, taught by the intellect, no doubt, that the Transcendent exists but never seeking to define it.

Its definition, in fact, could be only ‘the indefinable’: what is not a thing is not some definite thing. We are in agony for a true expression; we are talking of the untellable; we name, only to indicate for our own use as best we may. And this name, The One, contains really no more than the negation of plurality: under the same pressure the Pythagoreans found their indication in the symbol ‘Apollo’ (α = not; πολλῶν = of many) with its repudiation of the multiple. If we are led to think positively of The One, name and thing, there would be more truth in silence: the designation, a mere aid to inquiry, was never intended for more than a preliminary affirmation of absolute simplicity to be followed by the rejection of even that statement: it was the best that offered, but remains inadequate to express the nature indicated. For this is a principle not to be conveyed by any sound; it cannot be known on any hearing but, if at all, by vision; and to hope in that vision to see a form is to fail of even that.
 
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עכשיו מתחיל קריאה על החומר והשקיעה בעולם הריק.

אני יותר מדי בתוך מוד של טרולינג קשה להתייחס לזה ברצינות כרגע
 
  • אהבתי
סימוני אימוג׳י: Memento Mori
אני יותר מדי בתוך מוד של טרולינג קשה להתייחס לזה ברצינות כרגע
ראוי לציון פה השימוש של פלוטינוס באריסטו כמקור לביקורת שלו על פילוסופים מוקדמים יותר, לפני שהוא מפנה את ביקורתו כלפי אריסטו עצמו. לבסוף, פלוטינוס מציג טיעונים לזיהוי החומר עם היעדר טוב (privatio boni).
 
מקווה שאני אקרא בזה היום. אבל קמתי די הפוך. לא מוצא את הטלפון
לול
 
התחברתי לרעיון של האנאדה הראשונה. על המעלה הטובה. מירוק הנפש (קרי קתרזיס). להתקרב ליחס (likeness) אל האחד.

"There will be no battling in the Soul: the mere intervention of Reason is enough."

כשאני קורא את זה אני חושב
"מוח שליט על הלב"

@סוגוי
 
  • אהבתי
סימוני אימוג׳י: סוגוי
זה קטע מתחילת אנאדה א', טרקטט ב'.
  1. Since Evil is here, ‘haunting this world by necessary law’, and it is the Soul’s design to escape from Evil, we must escape hence.But what is this escape?‘In attaining Likeness to God,’ we read. And this is explained as ‘becoming just and holy, living by wisdom’, the entire nature grounded in Virtue.But does not Likeness by way of Virtue imply Likeness to some being that has Virtue? To what Divine Being, then, would our Likeness be? To the Being – must we not think? – in Which, above all, such excellence seems to inhere, that is to the Soul of the Cosmos and to the Principle ruling within it, the Principle endowed with a wisdom most wonderful. What could be more fitting than that we, living in this world, should become Like to its ruler?But, at the beginning, we are met by the doubt whether even in this Divine-Being all the virtues find place – Moral-Balance (Sophrosyny), for example; or Fortitude where there can be no danger since nothing is alien; where there can be nothing alluring whose lack could induce the desire of possession.If, indeed, that aspiration towards the Intelligible which is in our nature exists also in this Ruling-Power, then we need not look elsewhere for the source of order and of the virtues in ourselves.But does this Power possess the Virtues?We cannot expect to find There what are called the Civic Virtues, the Prudence which belongs to the reasoning faculty; the Fortitude which conducts the emotional and passionate nature; the Sophrosyny which consists in a certain pact, in a concord between the passionate faculty and the reason; or Rectitude which is the due application of all the other virtues as each in turn should command or obey.Is Likeness, then, attained, perhaps, not by these virtues of the social order but by those greater qualities known by the same general name? And if so do the Civic Virtues give us no help at all?It is against reason utterly to deny Likeness by these while admitting it by the greater: tradition at least recognizes certain men of the civic excellence as divine, and we must believe that these too had in some sort attained Likeness: on both levels there is virtue for us, though not the same virtue.Now, if it be admitted that Likeness is possible, though by a varying use of different virtues and though the civic virtues do not suffice, there is no reason why we should not, by virtues peculiar to our state, attain Likeness to a model in which virtue has no place.But is that conceivable?When warmth comes in to make anything warm, must there needs be something to warm the source of the warmth?If a fire is to warm something else, must there be a fire to warm that fire?Against the first illustration it may be retorted that the source of the warmth does already contain warmth, not by an infusion but as an essential phase of its nature, so that, if the analogy is to hold, the argument would make Virtue something communicated to the Soul but an essential constituent of the Principle from which the Soul attaining Likeness absorbs it.Against the illustration drawn from the fire, it may be urged that the analogy would make that Principle identical with virtue, whereas we hold it to be something higher.The objection would be valid if what the Soul takes in were one and the same with the source, but in fact virtue is one thing, the source of virtue is quite another. The material house is not identical with the house conceived in the intellect, and yet stands in its likeness: the material house has distribution and order while the pure idea is not constituted by any such elements; distribution, order, symmetry are not parts of an idea.So with us: it is from the Supreme that we derive order and distribution and harmony, which are virtues in this sphere: the Existences There, having no need of harmony, order, or distribution, have nothing to do with virtue; and, none the less, it is by our possession of virtue that we become like to Them.Thus much to show that the principle that we attain Likeness by virtue in no way involves the existence of virtue in the Supreme. But we have not merely to make a formal demonstration: we must persuade as well as demonstrate.
  2. First, then, let us examine those good qualities by which we hold Likeness comes, and seek to establish what is this thing which, as we possess it, in transcription, is virtue, but as the Supreme possesses it, is in the nature of an exemplar or archetype and is not virtue.We must first distinguish two modes of Likeness.There is the likeness demanding an identical nature in the objects which, further, must draw their likeness from a common principle: and there is the case in which B resembles A, but A is a Primal, not concerned about B and not said to resemble B. In this second case, likeness is understood in a distinct sense: we no longer look for identity of nature, but on the contrary, for divergence, since the likeness has come about by the mode of difference.What, then, precisely is Virtue, collectively and in the particular? The clearer method will be to begin with the particular,The Civic Virtues, on which we have touched above, are a principle of order and beauty in us as long as we remain passing our life here: they ennoble us by setting bound and measure to our desires and to our entire sensibility, and dispelling false judgement – and this by sheer efficacy of the better, by the very setting of the bounds, by the fact that the measured is lifted outside of the sphere of the unmeasured and lawless.And, further, these Civic Virtues – measured and ordered themselves and acting as a principle of measure to the Soul which is as Matter to their forming – are like to the measure reigning in the over-world, and they carry a trace of that Highest Good in the Supreme; for, while utter measurelessness is brute Matter and wholly outside of Likeness, any participation in Ideal-Form produces some corresponding degree of Likeness to the formless Being There. And participation goes by nearness: the Soul nearer than the body, therefore closer akin, participates more fully and shows a godlike presence, almost cheating us into the delusion that in the Soul we see God entire.This is the way in which men of the Civic Virtues attain Likeness.
  3. We come now to that other mode of Likeness which, we read, is the fruit of the loftier virtues: discussing this we shall penetrate more deeply into the essence of the Civic Virtue and be able to define the nature of the higher kind whose existence we shall establish beyond doubt.To Plato, unmistakably, there are two distinct orders of virtue, and the civic does not suffice for Likeness: ‘Likeness to God,’ he says, ‘is a flight from this world’s ways and things’.²¹ in dealing with the qualities of good citizenship he does not use the simple term Virtue but adds the distinguishing word civic: and elsewhere he declares all the virtues without exception to be purifications.But in what sense can we call the virtues purifications, and how does purification issue in Likeness?As the Soul is evil by being interfused with the body and by coming to share the body’s states and to think the body’s thoughts, so it would be good, it would be possessed of virtue, if it threw off the body’s moods and devoted itself to its own Act – the state of Intellection and Wisdom – never allowed the passions of the body to affect it – the virtue of Sophrosyny – knew no fear at the parting from the body – the virtue of Fortitude – and if reason and the Intellectual-Principle ruled without opposition – in which state is Righteousness. Such a disposition in the Soul, become thus intellective and immune to passion, it would not be wrong to call Likeness to God; for the Divine, too, is pure and the Divine-Act is such that Likeness to it is Wisdom.But would not this make virtue a state of the Divine also?No: the Divine has no states; the state is in the Soul. The Act of Intellection in the Soul is not the same as in the Divine: of things in the Supreme, one (the Intellectual-Principle) has a different mode of intellection (from that of Soul), the other (the Absolute One) has none at all.Then yet again, the one word, Intellection, covers two distinct Acts?Rather there is primal Intellection and there is Intellection deriving from the Primal and of other scope.As speech is the echo of the thought in the Soul, so thought in the Soul is an echo from elsewhere: that is to say, as the uttered thought is an image of the soul-thought, so the soul-thought images a thought above itself and is the interpreter of the higher sphere.Virtue, in the same way, is a thing of the Soul: it does not belong to the Intellectual-Principle or to the Transcendence
 
נערך לאחרונה:
We come, so, to the question whether Purification is the whole of this human quality, virtue, or merely the forerunner upon which virtue follows? Does virtue imply the achieved state of purification or does the mere process suffice to it, Virtue being something of less perfection than the accomplished pureness which is almost the Term?To have been purified is to have cleansed away everything alien: but Goodness is something more.If before the impurity entered there was Goodness, the cleansing suffices; but even so, not the act of cleansing but the cleansed thing that emerges will be The Good. And it remains to establish what (in the case of the cleansed Soul) this emergent is.It can scarcely prove to be The Good: The Absolute Good cannot be thought to have taken up its abode with Evil. We can think of it only as something of the nature of good but paying a double allegiance and unable to rest in the Authentic Good.The Soul’s true Good is in devotion to the Intellectual-Principle, its kin; evil to the Soul lies in frequenting strangers. There is no other way for it than to purify itself and so enter into relation with its own; the new phase begins by a new orientation.After the Purification, then, there is still this orientation to be made? No: by the purification the true alignment stands accomplished.The Soul’s virtue, then, is this alignment? No: it is what the alignment brings about within.And this is...?That it sees; that, like sight affected by the thing seen, the Soul admits the imprint, graven upon it and working within it, of the vision it has come to.²²But was not the Soul possessed of all this always, or had it forgotten?What it now sees, it certainly always possessed, but as lying away in the dark, not as acting within it: to dispel the darkness, and thus come to the knowledge of its inner content, it must thrust towards the light.Besides, it possessed not the originals but images, pictures; and these it must bring into closer accord with the verities they represent. And, further, if the Intellectual-Principle is said to be a possession of the Soul, this is only in the sense that It is not alien and that the link becomes very close when the Soul’s sight is turned towards It: otherwise, ever-present though It be, It remains foreign, just as our knowledge, if it does not determine action, is dead to us.5.So we come to the scope of the purification that understood, the nature of Likeness becomes clear. Likeness to what principle? Identity with what God?The question is substantially this: how far does purification dispel the two orders of passion – anger, desire, and the like, with grief and its kin – and in what degree the disengagement from the body is possible.Disengagement means simply that the Soul withdraws to its own place.It will hold itself above all passions and affections. Necessary pleasures and all the activity of the senses it will employ only for medicament and assuagement lest its work be impeded. Pain it may combat, but, failing the cure, it will bear meekly and ease it by refusing to assent to it. All passionate action it will check: the suppression will be complete if that be possible, but at worst the Soul will never itself take fire but will keep the involuntary and uncontrolled outside its own precincts and rare and weak at that. The Soul has nothing to dread, though no doubt the involuntary has some power here too: fear therefore must cease, except so far as it is purely monitory. What desire there may be can never be for the vile; even the food and drink necessary for restoration will lie outside the Soul’s attention, and not less the sexual appetite: or if such desire there must be, it will turn upon the actual needs of the nature and be entirely under control; or if any uncontrolled motion takes place, it will reach no further than the imagination, be no more than a fleeting fancy.The Soul itself will be inviolately free and will be working to set the irrational part of the nature above all attack, or if that may not be, then at least to preserve it from violent assault, so that any wound it takes may be slight and be healed at once by virtue of the Soul’s presence; just as a man living next door to a Proficient would profit by the neighbourhood, either in becoming wise and good himself or, for sheer shame, never venturing any act which the nobler mind would disapprove.There will be no battling in the Soul: the mere intervention of Reason is enough: the lower nature will stand in such awe of Reason that for any slightest movement it has made it will grieve, and censure its own weakness, in not having kept low and still in the presence of its lord.

הדרך לדבוק בטוב זה כאשר לא ימשול בך החומר. הוויה המופסדת. כזה שבעוכרי הנפש. הנשמה החפצה בטוב עליה להתרחק מרעת הרוח שלו והשעבוד לו
 
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